Legal Framework

The parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025 were conducted under the Electoral Code which entered into force on 1 January 2023 and was applied for the first time to a parliamentary election. The pre-electoral period was marked by substantial legislative amendments, including in 2025, affecting the Electoral Code as well as related legislation—the Law on Political Parties, the Contravention Code, the Criminal Code, and others.

These adjustments introduced new instruments for combating electoral corruption and preventing illegal political financing: harsher sanctions for fraud and abuse, shorter deadlines for examining cases of electoral corruption, and strengthened mechanisms for verifying financial reports. At the same time, postal voting was extended to ten countries, and stricter rules were introduced for the registration of electoral contestants, in order to enhance transparency and ensure equal access to electoral competition.

Nevertheless, the adoption of these amendments after the election date had been set undermined the stability of the legal framework. Moreover, decisions to refuse the registration of certain contestants, including on the basis of confidential information, raised questions regarding transparency and the prerogatives of certain institutions in the electoral process.

Overall, the new legal framework is more robust than in previous elections, establishing stronger barriers against abusive practices and reinforcing mechanisms of electoral integrity.

Institutional Framework

Electoral authorities and relevant institutions made visible efforts to ensure the proper conduct of the 2025 parliamentary elections. The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) operated in full composition, holding public meetings broadcast online and publishing adopted decisions; the publication of complaints and notifications also contributed to the transparency of the electoral process.

The General Inspectorate of Police (IGP) proved to be a stronger institution in swiftly documenting contraventions and suspicions of electoral corruption, while cooperation among the CEC, IGP, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Audiovisual Council (CA), and the Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) was more intensive than in previous elections.

However, law enforcement was not always applied uniformly, and in some cases discrepancies were observed in the handling of public gatherings or in sanctioning the use of administrative resources. Institutional communication regarding cases of electoral corruption was not consistently coherent, fuelling perceptions of panic and even impressions of politically coordinated processes.

Furthermore, certain political parties faced difficulties in complying with new administrative requirements, including the submission of mandatory documents to the Public Services Agency, which limited their ability to compete.

In sum, the institutional framework demonstrated higher capacity for coordination and professionalism, yet deficiencies in the uniform application of the law, uneven communication, and insufficient transparency of certain sensitive decisions remained major challenges to strengthening trust in the integrity of the electoral process.

Electoral Campaign

The 2025 electoral campaign was conducted, in general terms, in accordance with legal provisions, providing eligible candidates the opportunity to compete and voters the opportunity to express their political preferences. Freedom of assembly and expression was generally respected, and the legal framework permitted competition.

Nonetheless, the electoral process was heavily influenced by factors that undermined the quality of democratic debate. Electoral discourse exploited fear of war rather than focusing on policy programs and public agendas. Negative rhetoric, hate speech, and socially divisive messages were extensively used by electoral contestants.

The campaign shifted significantly to the online environment, a space insufficiently regulated and vulnerable to manipulation and coordinated disinformation campaigns. Unauthorized and manipulative polls circulated freely on digital platforms, influencing the electoral climate.

Another problematic phenomenon was the use of administrative resources in favour of certain contestants, including the organized mobilization of public sector employees or the use of state infrastructure and financial means for electoral promotion. These practices compromised the fairness

of competition and created perceptions of abusive involvement of authorities in favour of particular candidates.

The campaign was also marked by unrealistic promises and messages contrary to democratic values and fundamental rights, including attacks on journalists and civil society organizations. Indirect involvement of religious denominations was also observed in this election, in contravention of the principle of separation of church and state.

In the territory controlled by the de facto administration in Tiraspol, once again, electoral contestants, civil society, and the media were unable to conduct information campaigns or hold meetings with voters. Restrictions on free movement, informational isolation, and limitations imposed on residents of the Transnistrian region remain serious obstacles to conscious voting conditions.

Overall, although the 2025 electoral campaign formally respected the law, the dominance of polarizing discourse, online disinformation, use of administrative resources, and the absence of genuine pluralistic debates substantially diminished the quality of political competition.

Campaign Financing and Electoral Corruption

The parliamentary elections took place within a framework of stricter rules for reporting and controlling the financing of political parties and electoral contestants. The CEC showed stronger commitment to the integrity of the process, applying proportionate sanctions and excluding formations that failed to respect transparency standards. The financial discipline of contestants was visibly higher compared to previous elections, and consistent enforcement of reporting obligations represents an important step forward.

Despite these advances, electoral corruption took on more sophisticated and harder-to-document forms. Cases were identified of paid mobilization of protest participants, use of encrypted messaging applications for campaign coordination, opaque financial transfers, as well as simulated payments and illegal collection of personal data. A significant share of electoral communication occurred prior to the official campaign period, funded from sources whose reporting was delayed, creating an uneven playing field.

Although the updated legal framework introduced stronger tools for preventing and sanctioning electoral corruption, the persistence of illicit schemes, lack of regulation of third-party funded activities, and discrepancies between reported and actual expenditures continue to affect the integrity and transparency of electoral competition.

Media and Online Environment

The national legal framework regarding media coverage of elections was improved through updates to audiovisual legislation and the transposition of European Union standards for nonlinear media platforms. These amendments reinforced rules applicable to media institutions, seeking to ensure greater clarity, fairness, and transparency in presenting electoral contestants.

The Audiovisual Council (CA) carried out, for the first time, an extended monitoring of compliance with electoral legislation by audiovisual service providers who declared coverage of the 28 September 2025 parliamentary campaign. Monitoring encompassed the entire campaign, including “electoral silence” days, covering all five types of programs prescribed by the Electoral Code. Additionally, in May 2025,

the CA imposed the first-ever sanction on a nonlinear provider for disseminating covert political advertising, signalling an expansion of oversight into the online sphere as well.

Despite this progress, civil society monitoring revealed multiple breaches of fair coverage rules. Some television stations provided access to all contestants in news and programs, while others focused predominantly on state institutions’ activities, thereby diminishing the visibility of certain candidates. In some cases, manifestations of political bias and violations of the Audiovisual Media Services Code were observed.

The 2025 campaign was characterized by intensive use of online platforms and social networks, which became the primary channel for communication, mobilization, and promotion by parties and candidates. Online spaces also hosted the most extensive coordinated disinformation campaigns and falsehoods aimed at undermining trust in institutions and exploiting fears related to security and war. Concurrently, attacks against independent media and smear campaigns fuelled public mistrust.

CALC acknowledges the efforts of independent and investigative journalists who, through documenting non-transparent financing schemes and manipulation campaigns, contributed to informing the public and highlighting issues of integrity among electoral contestants.

Electoral Inclusiveness

The expansion by approximately 30% of polling stations abroad, along with the implementation of postal voting in several countries, constituted important measures to strengthen the voting rights of citizens in the diaspora. The high voter turnout abroad reconfirmed the need to further extend the network of polling stations outside the country.

The relocation, on the eve of election day, of certain polling stations designated for voters from the Transnistrian region was officially justified on security grounds, yet the transparency of such decisions was insufficient. Moreover, the reduction in the number of polling stations and ballots allocated to voters from the left bank of the Dniester, although also officially justified by decreased turnout in previous elections, adversely affected citizens’ effective access to the polls and generated frustration on election day. Consequently, these measures restricted the right to vote, and the manner in which such decisions were adopted fuelled uncertainty and suspicions regarding the fairness and equity of the electoral process.

This election saw progress in ensuring voting access for persons with disabilities, through adaptation of a greater number of polling stations and implementation of additional measures to support their participation. Nevertheless, issues of physical accessibility persist in many locations, continuing to pose significant barriers to the full exercise of voting rights by persons with reduced mobility.

With respect to gender equality, compliance with the gender quota and application of rules on list placement contributed to an increase in the number of female candidates. However, the insufficient placement of women in winnable positions limited the effects of these measures: estimates indicate that the new Parliament will include approximately 37 women, below the 40% quota required by law and lower than in previous legislatures. A noteworthy positive aspect of the 2025 elections is the more active engagement of young voters, who participated in greater numbers than in previous elections.

In conclusion, while the 2025 elections marked significant progress in facilitating voting access for the diaspora, youth, and persons with disabilities, gaps remain regarding gender equality and the